Social Conventions

This entry reviews the major theoretical accounts of social conventions. It first introduces briefly their philosophical origin and then goes on to present the first contemporary systematic account of social conventions in terms of game theory. This is followed by an overview of some of the main theories and uses of social conventions in current work in the philosophy of social science

Convention: an interdisciplinary study

No abstract availabl

Convention: an interdisciplinary study

No abstract availabl

Making our ends meet: shared intention, goal adoption and the third-person perspective

Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others\u27 and ones\u27 own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent\u27s achieve p because and as long as another agent has that goal that p. Having clarified the relevance of mutual goal adoption for acting jointly, I argue that when an intention is shared between several agents, each individual has an intention in favour of the joint action and one in favour of a joint mode of reasoning. This mode of reasoning is allocentric reasoning. Finally, I elaborate on the consequences of this view for the scientific study of human collaboration

Abstract concepts, language and sociality. From acquisition to inner speech

The problem of representation of abstract concepts, such as “freedom” and “justice”, has become particularly crucial in recent years, due to the increased success of embodied and grounded views of cognition. We will present a novel view on abstract concepts and abstract words. Since abstract concepts do not have single objects as referents, children and adults might rely more on input from others in learning them; we therefore suggest that linguistic and social experience play an important role for abstract concepts. We will discuss evidence obtained in our and other labs showing that processing of abstract concepts evokes linguistic interaction and social experiences, leading to the activation of the mouth motor system. We will discuss the possible mechanisms that underlie this activation. Mouth activation can be due to re-enactment of the experience of conceptual acquisition, which occurred through the mediation of language. Alternatively, it could be due to the re-explanation of the word meaning, possibly through inner speech. Finally, it can be due to a metacognitive process revealing low confidence on the meaning of our concepts. This process induces in us the need to rely on others to ask/negotiate conceptual meaning. We conclude that with abstract concepts words work as social tools: they extend our thinking abilities and push us to rely on others to integrate our knowledge

The cognitive and behavioral mediation of institutions: Towards an account of institutional actions.

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of institutional actions from the standpoint of cognitive science. The notion of constitutive rules have been proposed to describe the conceptual nature of institutions. In this paper it is extended to cover specific processes of \u27recognition\u27 that provide the agents with additional artificial powers. The power of doing an institutional action is considered as a special kind of artificial power. It is argued that institutional actions achieve their effects thanks to a cognitive and behavioral mediation of a collective of agents. Individual actions are seen and treated as (count as) institutional actions by the involved participants even if, in fact, institutional actions are collective actions. When human behavior becomes institutionalized, it acquires special conventional powers to bring about effects in the social world. A model of such conventional empowerment of an agent is proposed and is identified in a sort of collective permission. Finally it is argued that institutions are a specific kind of coordination artifacts. In particular, the importance of institutional roles as artifacts that assign conventional powers is investigated

Cognition, Joint Action and Collective Intentionality

No abstract availabl

AmI Systems as Agent-Based Mirror Worlds: Bridging Humans and Agents through Stigmergy

In this chapter we introduce a vision of agent-oriented AmI systems that is extended to integrate ideas inspired by MirrorWorlds as introduced by Gelernter at the beginning of the eighties. In this view, AmI systems are actually a digital world mirroring but also augmenting the physical world with capabilities, services and functionalities.We then discuss the value of stigmergy as background reference conceptual framework to define and understand interactions occurring between the physical environments and its digital agent-based extension. The digital world augments the physical world so that traces left by humans acting in the physical world are represented in the digital one in order to be perceived by software agents living there and, viceversa, actions taken by software agents in the mirror can have an effect on the connected physical counterpart

A marriage is an artefact and not a walk that we take together: An experimental study on the categorization of artefacts

Artefacts are usually understood in contrast with natural kinds and conceived as a unitary kind. Here we propose that there is in fact a variety of artefacts: from the more concrete to the more abstract ones. Moreover, not every artefact is able to fulfil its function thanks to its physical properties: Some artefacts, particularly what we call "institutional" artefacts, are symbolic in nature and require a system of rules to exist and to fulfil their function. Adopting a standard method to measure conceptual representation (the property generation task), we have experimentally explored how humans conceptualise these different kinds of artefacts. Results indicate that institutional artefacts are typically opposed to social objects, while being more similar to standard artefacts, be they abstract or concrete